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Abstract
Nous estimons un mode`le collectif d’offre de travail. Pour les femmes, l’offre de
travail est mode´lise´e dans le cadre d’un mode`le de choix discret prenant en compte la
possibilite´ de non-participation (Vermeulen, 2006). Contrairement, l’offre de travail
des hommes est conside´re´ comme exoge`ne dans cette e´tude. Le mode`le collectif est
estime´ sur des donne´es e´gyptiennes provenant du “Egyptian labor market and panel
survey” de 2006. L’originalite´ de cette e´tude est de tester la validite´ de nouvelles
sources de pouvoir pour les femmes comme facteurs de distribution. Ces dernie`res
sont des variables lie´es au marche´ du mariage, a` la violence domestique, a` l’acce`s
direct de la femme au revenu du me´nage, ainsi que sa participation dans la prise
de de´cision dans la famille. L’identification du mode`le repose principalement sur
l’hypothe`se que seulement certains des parame`tres sont identiques pour les femmes
marie´es et pour les femmes ce´libataires. Nous trouvons de fortes relations entre ces
dernie`res et l’offre de travail des femmes.
Abstract
This paper examines the intrahousehold ressource allocation in Egyptian mar-
ried couples and its impact on females labor supply. Using data from the Egyptian
Labor market and Panel Survey of 2006, we estimate a discrete-choice model for fe-
male labor supply within a collective framework. The economic model incorporates
the possibility of non-participation for females which represents the working situa-
tion of more than 70 percent of Egyptian married women. The originality of this
paper consists on testing new distribution factors, i.e., a set of exogenous variables
which influence the intrahousehold allocation of resources without affecting pref-
erences or the budget constraint. The latter are variables related to the marriage
market, gender attitudes, domestic violence, direct access to the household income
and participation in household decision making. Identification of the model relies
on the assumption that only some parameters of the utility function are identical
for single and married females. We find significant relations between females bar-
gaining power and labor supply decisions. This study’s results has important policy
implications.
JEL classification: D11, D12, J22
Mots-cle´s : Mode`le collectif d’offre de travail, Facteurs de distribution, Maximum de
Vraisemblance Simule´e, Egypte.
Keywords: Collective model, labor supply, Distribution factors, Maximum simulated like-
lihood, Egypt.
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1 Introduction
Recent studies have shown that gender inequalities persist in the household sphere as
well as in the labor market. The latter result has been verified in both developed and
developing countries. The present paper aims at exploring intrahousehold ressource allo-
cation in married couples in Egypt.
The standard and basic ’Unitary’ approach considers the household as a single decision
making unit. This unitary framework is also called ’inefficient household modeling’ since
the income pooling assumption has largely been rejected in previous studies (Thomas,
1990; Clark et al., 2004; Lundberg et al., 1997; Fortin and Lacroix, 1997; Duflo, 2003).
And using Egyptian micro data, a recent study by Namoro and Roushdy (2008), has
also rejected the unitary approach. Moreover, the latter model does not allow to study
intrahousehold allocation issues since it completely overlooks all kinds of multi-sources
of power that could exist between members of a same household. For those reasons, a
growing literature on the collective modeling of the household that is also called ’the in-
dividualistic approach’, has been introduced by Chiappori (1988b, 1992) and Apps and
Rees (1988). The latter has been progressively applied in microeconomic literature in or-
der to study intrahousehold allocations with regards to the plurality of the decision makers
within the household. The key assumption of the collective model is that the behavior
of family members can be seen as the outcome of an pareto efficient process (Chiappori,
1988, 1992; Browning and Chiappori, 1998; Dauphin and Fortin, 2001; Vermeulen, 2002a;
Chiappori and Ekeland, 2002a; Donni, 2004). In addition to that, testable implications
of the collective approach turn out to be less restrictive than those of the unitary one.
Using data from the Egyptian Labor market and Panel Survey of 2006, we estimate an
econometrically identifiable collective model of labor supply which incorporates the pos-
sibility of non-participation for females. The model is estimated using conditional logit
and mixed logit specifications. In the latter case, estimation is done by the Maximum
Simulated Likelihood.
The collective framework that we estimate is inspired from Vermeulen (2006). The nov-
elty of the present study lies in the application of the model to within ressource allocation
issues in Egypt. Original distribution factors are tested here. Though, our model suffers
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from the non incorporation of neither tax schemes nor domestic activities. One more lim-
itation of the Vermeulen’s model is that male labor supply is considered to be exogenous.
In the empirical work, both married females’ preferences and their share of total house-
hold consumption are completely identified. Two types of females are considered in this
study. On the first hand, we consider married women currently living with their husband
conditional on the non presence of young children (aged less than 15). And on the other
hand, we consider single women in age of marriage who are still living in the parental
household. Egoistic preferences are assumed, i.e., women only care about their own con-
sumption and their own leisure. Single women preferences are directly recovered since
both working hours and consumption can be calculated at each alternative. Note that,
as a result of cultural and religious habits in Egypt, females in age of marriage continue
living in their parental household till they get married. Then, we rely on the Equivalent
scales method in order to calculate their non labor income share. For married women,
the individual consumption cannot not observed, which means that the coefficient on the
female’s individual consumption is no longer identified. For this, the assumption that
some, and not all, coefficients of the utility function are identical is key for the complete
identification of the sharing rule. Only the coefficient on the working hours variable is
allowed to differ between the two groups of women.
The present research is then interested in the bargaining power of Egyptian females and
its main goal is to determine the share that each partner receives from the household net
income.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the literature review on the
subject in both developed and developing countries. Section 3 exhibits the Vermeulen
(2006)’s discrete choice model of female labor supply and discusses the identification of
the sharing rule. Section 4 is devoted to the presentation of the data used in the empirical
work as well as the original sources of females empowerment. Section 5 presents the main
results. And, section 6 concludes and discusses the main policy implications of the study.
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2 The Discrete Choice Model of Labor Supply
The model we estimate is inspired from Vermeulen (2006). This is a discrete choice
model of labor supply that takes into account the possibility of non participation for
females. As describes above, two types of household are considered in this analysis: single
females still living in parental households and married females currently living with their
husband. Only the females labor supply is modeled and males labor supply is assumed to
be exogenous.
2.1 Females Preferences
Following Vermeulen (2006), we consider all households that consist of two working
age individuals; the female and the male (f and m). Males labor supplies are considered
to be exogenous and fixed to full time; which is clearly supported by our data since all
males in our sample are working around 48 hours per week. Furthermore, the model
assumes egoistic preferences which implies that females have preferences only over their
own consumption and their own leisure (see Chiappori; 1998). 1
Female labor supply is modeled as a disrete choice between J alternatives for weekly
working hours (Van Soest, 1995). Regarding the estimation methodology, we opt for both
conditional logit and mixed logit specifications in order to compare the different utility
levels associated to each of the labor supply alternatives. Then, in a second stage, we
choose the choice that yields the highest utility. In other words, the female i chooses the
alternative j only if her utility ufij is the maximum among the J alternatives. Hence, the
statistical model is driven by the probability that the choice j is made (Greene, 2003),
Prob(uij > uik)forj 6= k
The utility of alternative j for the individual f is represented as follows,
ufj = V (cfj, lfj, df ) + εfj (1)
1The assumption of egoistic preferences.can be relaxed by assuming “‘caring” preferences which would
imply that individual preferences will also depend on their partner consumption and leisure.
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where cfj is the female’s private consumption at alternative j, lfj represents the female’s
working hours encompassing the time spent on domestic activities. And dfj consists on
a vector of individual characteristics as the age, the education level and the region of
residence. Then, this vector consists on capturing the preferences observed heterogeneity.
Note that individuals’ consumptions, for both singles and married women, cannot go
beyond the household’s gross income. Budget constraints can then be represented as,
for married females:
cfj + cmj ≤ Y + wfjlfj + wmjlmj ≡ x (2)
for single females:
cfj ≤ Y single+ wfjlfj (3)
Where Y is the household’s non labor income, wfj denotes the female’s hourly wage rate
at alternative j, lfj is the female’s labor supply, and cfj represents the individual’s private
consumption.
For single women, consumption cfj is equal to the net income , which is calculated for
each j alternative from knowledge of the wage offer (observed or potential wages) and
of non labor income. Note that, as a result of the traditional and religious norms in
Egypt, single women continue living in their parents’ household till moving to the marital
household. Consequently, the singles’ non labor income is not observed. One way to
calculate it is by relying on the ’Equivalent scales’ method. This method is approved
by statisticians and it consists on dividing the parental household’s non labor income by
the number of individuals living in it in order to obtain Y single, which represents the
non labor income of single females. And, since wfj, lfj and Y single are observed, the
individual’s consumption can simply be calculated for single women. And, the estimation
of the discrete choice model is straightforward. However, for married females, only the
household consumption (cfj + cmj) can be obtained. Consequently, the parameters of
the female’s utility function are no longer identified. With the unitary framework, this
model doest not seem to be a problem since the household is assumed to be acting as a
single individual. This implies, consequently, the famous income pooling assumption that
6
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consists on the idea that it makes no difference whether the non labor income is addressed
to the husband or the wife. However, as presented above in this study, this assumption has
largely been rejected using data from both developed and developing countries. And, for
the case of Egypt, Namoro and Roushdy (2008) have rejected the unitary approach when
they showed that mothers and fathers characteristics have differential effects on children’s
education. Moreover, The unitary framework does not allow the study of intrahousehold
allocation issues, which represents the main objective of the present research. All those
reasons motivate us to rather rely on the collective framework.
Collective models are also called “efficient models” because they rely on the famous Pareto
efficiency assumption regarding household outcomes (see Chiappori; 1988, 1992). The
latter assumed to be the result of a two stage budgeting process. The first stage consists
on distributing the total household expenditure among members of the same household.
this income distribution process is mainly the result of spouses bargaining powers. And, in
a second stage, each spouse maximizes its utility subject to his budget constraint resulted
from the first stage. This process leads to the following maximization problem,
maxcfj lfjV (cfj, lfj, df ) (4)
subject to:
cfj ≤ φ(x, z) (5)
where φ(.) is the sharing rule function which represents the female’s share of the total
household expenditure. This share directly depends on individual wages, household’s non
labor income and a vector z of distribution factors. , i.e., exogenous variables which
influence the intrahousehold allocation of resources without affecting preferences or the
budget constraint.
Following Vermeulen (2006), we assume the following functional form for the observed
part:
Vfj = βl(df )lfj + βll(df )(lfj)
2 + βccfj + βcllfjcfj (6)
7
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Then, the female’s utility function depends not only on factors that varies across the
alternatives as cfj and lfj but also on individuals specific variables as df . Consequently,
the model has to allow for individual specific effects. And, one way to do so is to introduce
a variable for the choices and multiply it by this individual specific vector df in order to
allow the coefficient to vary not only across the individuals but also across the alternatives
(Greene, 2003).
As mentioned above, individual levels of consumption cfj can only be calculated for single
females. However, for married females, we observe their household consumptions. Though,
we know that the private consumption of the latter group equals to the share of the total
household consumption x that is allocated to them via the sharing rule.2
2.2 Introducing Unobserved Heterogeneity
Individual unobserved heterogeneity is introduces into the model via the following
terms: βll(df ) and βl(df ) as there is random variation in the coefficients on l and l
2
conditional on the observed factors d,
βll(df ) = βll0 + β
′
ll1df + νllf (7)
βl(df ) = βl0 + β
′
l1df + νlf (8)
Those additional parameters βll(df ) and βl(df ) are estimated using a random coefficient
model (mixed logit model). This model is estimated using Maximum Simulated Likelihood
(Train, 2003). And, the errors terms νllf and νlf are assumed to be normally distributed
as follows,  νllf
νlf
 ≈ N(0,Σ)
with
Σ =
 σ2νll ρ
ρ σ2νl
 ≈ N(0,Σ)
For simplicity, and following Vermeulen (2006), we assume that ρ = 0.
2This share is the result of the bargaining process.
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2.3 The Sharing Rule
Estimating the sharing rule is one the main goals of this study. The latter can be
defined as the unobserved share κ that the female gets from the household net income
through some bargaining process. And, as presented in the equation bellow, this sharing
rule φ is function of individual characteristics xfj as well as a vector zf of distribution
factors.
cfj = φ(xfj, zf ) (9)
One main contribution of this paper is the testing of distribution factors that are new to
the literature on collective model and quite original to the Egyptian context such as the
contribution to the costs marriage, gender attitudes, domestic violence, direct access to
the household income and participation in household decision making.
The sharing rule itself can the be written as follows,
φ(xfj, zf ) = (1 + κ1 + κ2zf )xfj (10)
where κ1 and κ1 represent the sharing rule parameters to be estimated. As κ2 represents
the distribution factor parmarmeter, the idea is that if κ2 is positive, then, more empow-
ered women get a bigger share of the household net income than less empowered ones.
And this is assumed to have important implications on females labor supply decisions.
To take into account the single versus married women distinction, we also add the indi-
cator variable dCouplef .
3
The private consumption of all women, whether married or singles, can then be re-written
as follows,
cfj = (1 + κ1dCouplef + κ2dCouplefzf )xfj (11)
3This indicator variable equals to 1 if married and equals to zero if single.
9
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2.4 Identification
The model aims at identifying the sharing rule of married females using preferences of
single ones. This identification procedure has already been applied in some of the previous
studies. Bamby and Smith (2001) assumed that all preferences of individuals in couples
are similar to those of singles. However, in the present study, as in Vermeulen (2006), this
assumption will be relaxed as it will presented in details in this section.
The identification procedure consists on the use of the difference in parameters between
single and married females in order to infer something about the sharing rule.
By plugging the last private consumption’s equation into the utility function to obtain,
Ufj = βldf lfj + βlldf (lfj)
2 + βc(1 + κ1dCouplef + κ2dCouplefzf )xfj
+βcllfj(1 + κ1dCouplef + κ2dCouplefzf )xij + εfj (12)
This last expression can also be written separately for married and single females.
for married females: where dCouplef = 1
Ufj = βldf lfj + βlldf (lij)
2 + [βcxfj + β
∗
c1dCouple
∗
fxfj]
+[βcllfjxfj + β
∗
cl1dCouple
∗
f lfjxfj + β
∗
cl2zf lfjxfj] (13)
for single females: where dCouplef = 0
Ufj = βldf lfj + βlldf (lfj)
2 + βcxfj + βcllfjxfj (14)
The latter equations show that single and married females may react differently to labor
supply parameters βl and βll. The parameters for single women are βc; βcl and those for
married women are β∗c1 = βcκ1 ; β
∗
cl1 = βclκ1. In other words, β
∗
c1 represents the difference
between how married and single females value a unit of household expenditure. And, since
κ1 should be the same regardless of whether it is calculated via xij or l
f
ijxij, then we need
to impose the following restrictions:
κ1 =
β∗cl1
βcl
=
β∗c1
βc
, (15)
10
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And,
κ2 =
β∗cl2
βc2
=
β∗c2
βc
, (16)
In other words, the sharing rule parameters κ1 and κ2 can directly be calculated as, by
estimation of the discrete choice model, the following parameters are identified,
βll(df ), βcl, β
∗
cl1 = βclκ1, β
∗
cl2 = βclκ2, βc, β
∗
c1 = βcκ1, β
∗
c2 = βcκ2 (17)
And the standard errors of the sharing rule are calculated using the delta method.
To put into a nutshell, The identification of the sharing rule rely on the assumption
that (only) some of married females’ preferences are identical to singles’. More precisely,
we allow for the coefficients on labor supply βl and βll,and hence the marginal rates of
substitution, to differ from married to single females. And, only the coefficients related
to the private consumption terms βc and βclare assumed to be identical for for both types
of females.
Note that while we can easily identify different reactions of single and married females to
household consumption, the actual twist of the collective model is to make use of that
information in order to infer something about the sharing rule. For this, we rely on the
idea that married women value less each unit of household consumption since they only
get a share of it for their own private consumption. And, “how much they value it less” is
used to identify the sharing rule given two additional assumptions. The first consists on
assuming that single females only care about private consumption.
3 The Data
3.1 Data Description
Data used in this study are obtained from the Egyptian Labor Market and panel
Survey (ELMPS) of 2006. This is the second wave of a nationally-representative household
survey conducted in 1998. And it consists of a total of 8,349 households. The 2006
11
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.35
ELMPS data is composed of three main questionnaires (see Barssoum, 2007). First, the
household questionnaire that contains information on basic demographic characteristics
of household members, movement of household members in and out of the household
since 1998, ownership of durable goods and assets, and housing conditions. Then we find
the individual questionnaire that is administered to the individual him/herself. The latter
contains information on parental background, detailed education histories, activity status,
job search and unemployment, detailed employment characteristics, a module on women’s
work, migration histories, job histories, time use, earnings and fertility. In addition to this,
a new critical module has been added to the questionnaire in order to allow a profound
examination of marriage dynamics in Egypt. The latter contains detailed information
on costs of marriage as well as costs of divorce. And finally, the questionnaire contains
a household enterprise and income module that elicits information on all agricultural
and non-agricultural enterprises operated by the household as well as all income sources,
including remittances and transfers.
The ELMPS is the first panel data available in the Arab region and is known for its
richness that allow economists to profoundly study various issues related to the Egyptian
labor market.
3.2 Sample Selection
Turning to labor supplies of single and married females, we aim at observing the dif-
ference in bargaining power between males and females. Two samples are selected for the
empirical exercise. The first one consists on married women, husbands being present in
the household, aged from 16 to 55 years old. And, all males are assumed to be working full
time (48 hours or more). We exclude all households with children aged less than 15 since
we assume that household net income is split into private consumptions of the husband
and the wife. We are aware that the latter is a quite strong assumption especially for the
Egyptian context. Students, self employed, unvoluntarily unemployed, and (pre) retired
are excluded from the dataset. Females’ breadwinners are also excluded here because
those women don’t work to achieve self dependence but they are rather enforced due to
economic reasons and led to role conflicting (Nassar, 2002). And, the second sample study
consists on single females that are selected subject to the same sample selection of mar-
12
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ried females. The sample sizes are 1,492 and 1,257 for married and singles respectively.
Note that all females can be employed due to the extended definition of employment or
voluntarily unemployed 4and that employed females can be paid in monetary (for wage
employees) or in kind (for unpaid family workers). The latter represents the case of 28.7
percent of the whole working sample.
In the empirical exercise, we estimate a discrete choice model where the female chooses
between J labor supply alternatives; see e.g. Train (2003). Four alternatives are consid-
ered here: Non participants with lf = 0; Employed “part time” with lf ∈]0, 25]; Employed
“full time” with lf ∈]25, 35] and over employed with lf > 35.
Clearly, the sample study is characterized by a high proportion of females non-participation
that reach 71.30 percent. And, 93.24 percent of the latter declare not desiring and not
ready to work during the reference period. Those non-participant females’ real hourly
wages are estimated by means of Heckman’s two-step estimation procedure to correct for
the selectivity bias.
As represented in figure 1, 62 percent of females in our sample are married. Contrarily
to single females, married females are majoritarly concentrated in the inactivity and the
full-time status; 70 percent of the non-participant population and 57 percent of the full-
time working population are married. On the other hand, 55 percent of females working
more than 35 hours per week are singles. In figure 2 we observe that 60 percent of singles
and 80 percent of married women are inactive. And, very small proportions are concerned
by the part-time and Full-time alternatives. One explanation is that Single females work
mainly to save money for marriage and once they get married they usually stop working
(see e.g. Amin & Al-Bassisi, 2003).
To put into a nutshell, as observed in these figures, a significantly large proportion of
females do not participate in the labor market. And, married females seem to be more
concerned by this inactivity situation.
[Figures 1 and 2 about here]
Figures 3 and 4 display the females distribution by levels of education and labour
supply alternatives. Clearly, the majority of Egyptian females tend to not participate in
4This market labor force includes those engaged in the production of economic goods and services
whether for the market or for barter (ILO, 1982).
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market work whether they are educated or not. We can then predict that a similar reality
could have negative effects on females’ incentives to education. Six levels education are
Considered and we properly separate between females enrolled in vocational (technical)
and general education. As showed in these figures, we can observe that regardless the
marital status, high proportions of technically educated women choose alternatives 1 and
4. For singles, 32 percent are inactive and 38 percent are working more than 35 hours a
week. In contrast, having a university degree increase the probability of one woman to be
active; 23 percent, 35 percent and 31 percent of single women having a university level of
schooling are working part-time, full time and more than 35 hours a week respectively.
[Figures 3 and 4 about here]
Finally, for married females, about 50 percent of the full-time working and 45 percent
of the part-time working populations never went to school before. Married women having
high levels of education as a university degree tend to spend more than 35 hours per week
in the labor market. And, this is also the case of females having technical education.
Interestingly, females having general education completely disappear from the part-time
and full-time situations. The latter observation could reflects the greater need of the
Egyptian labor market for vocational education rather than general education.
3.3 Sources of Bargaining Power
Concerning distribution factors, our data allows us to test new direct measures of
married females bargaining power. Contrary to Chiappori et al. (2002), the sex ratio does
not seem to be a convenient distribution factor for a developing country as Egypt. And,
for that specific reason, we try to find out the main sources of females’ power in Arab
countries in general and specifically in Egypt. Various factors are tested here. First are
factors related the marriage market as the female’s contribution to total costs of marriage
(see Roushdy, 2004) and the “moakhar” which represents the amount of money that the
male will have to pay to his wife in case of divorce. Amin and Al-Bassusi (2003) showed
that the average marriage costs in Egypt are substantially higher relatively to the rest
of the Arab world. In addition to that, the girl’s “gehaz” or trousseau is ritualized to
make its content public knowledge to benefit the bride by displaying her family’s wealth,
14
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presumably to enhance her status within her new marital family. The assumption is then
that the more assets she brings to her new household, the better will be her bargaining
position. Concerning the moakhar, this value is determined before the marriage takes
place which assure its exogeneity. Furthermore, we test variables that could mostly be
considered as measures of the female’s capacity within her own family. Examples of such
variables are: the female’s participation in the decision making process, her access to the
household financial resources, her mobility and domestic violence against her.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Empowerment and Labor Supply Decisions
Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 display the results of the generalized method of moments estima-
tions. The latter aims at testing the effect of different sources of females empowerment
on labour supply decisions. The dependent variable being a continuous variable of labor
supply. And, in these estimations, females and males’ labor incomes are instruments by a
vector of demographic variables that characterize both the individual and the household.
Table 2 shows the existence of a significantly positive relationship between different
sources females’ empowerment and labour supply decisions. We control for different house-
hold characteristics as the household size, the household wealth, the household non labour
income and the region. We also control for individual and spouses’ characteristics as age,
educational level and labour income. The“empowerment indicators”are constructed using
factor analysis. In the first column we observe the significant positive effect of participa-
tion in household’s decision making on females’ labour supply. For instance, participating
in household decisions increase one female’s labour supply by 12 hours a week relative to
those who do not participate at all in the decision making process. This “decision making
indicator” consists on weighting different decision making variables as: Buying clothes for
herself, Getting medical treatment or advice for herself and her visits to family, friends or
relatives etc...
As to empowerment indicators, gender role attitudes positively and significantly influence
female’s labour supply. The “gender role attitude indicator” reflects females agreements
with equal gender roles as: a woman’s place is not only in the household but she should be
15
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allowed to work, If the wife has a job outside the house then the husband should help her
with the children, If the wife has a job outside the house then the husband should help her
in household chores, For a woman’s financial autonomy, she must work and have earnings
and Women should continue to occupy leadership positions in society. See the appendix
for more details on gender role attitudes variables. This result shows that women sup-
porting a better gender equality situation tend, in a sense, to be more empowered and to
spend more time outside home activities.
Clearly, having direct access to household money increase a females’ labour supply at a 5
percent level of significance.
Finally, these factors directly affect a female’s bargaining power within her family and,
consequently influence her participation in outside home activities; which could be the
result of females preference heterogeneity or state dependence.
[Table 2 about here]
Tables 3 and 4 display the effect of other sources of females’ empowerment on labour
supply. In table 4 we observe a positive and significant relationship between the female’s
contribution to costs of marriage. This verifies our assumption presented above that
consists on the idea that the more females and their families contribute to costs of marriage
and the more her bargaining power increase in her own household after marriage. In
addition to this, female’s labour supply seem to increase with the level of education but
the husband’s education does not have any significant effect on his spouse’s labour supply.
Moreover, women living in urban and rural regions spend less hours in the labor market
than women living in Cairo the capital and Alexandria.
[Tables 3 and 4 about here]
The results presented above, contrarily to the common literature, show that more em-
powered married women work more in the market. Now the question is, do they on the
other side spend less time on domestic activities that we call here “home based activities”.
To answer this question, we estimate a system of structural equations, where the market
labour equation contains an endogenous variable among the explanatory variables. This
endogenous variable is the “domestic labour supply”. Typically, this endogenous regres-
sor is a dependent variable from another equation in the system. Estimation is done via
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three-stage least squares.
Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9 presented bellow display the results of the structural equations sys-
tem. Turning to 6, it is quite clear that the more the female participates in the household
decision making process and the more she works not only in the market but also at home.
Interestingly, those females have more bargaining power but that seems to not decrease
their family burden. However, The latter significantly decreases with the spouse’s labor
income. For instance, having a richer husband decrease one female’s number of hours
spent in labour market activities.
Similarly for the gender attitude indicator. It is worth mentioning that females encourag-
ing less gender inequalities spend weekly 13 hours more in the labour market than other
women. However, the latter does not affect female’s domestic labour supply.
[Tables 6 about here]
Interestingly, in table 8, the presence of domestic violence increases significantly one
female’s family burden and time spent on work at home. One explanation for this could
be the weak position of these females within their households.
[Tables 8 about here]
Finally, table 9 shows the effect of other sources of females empowerment on both
market labour supply and domestic labour supply. Wa can observe that being afraid of
men in the household decreases the domestic labour supply with a level of significance of
10 percent. This could be due to the will of these women to shirk domestic violence by
staying outside home.
[Tables 9 about here]
In conclusion, more empowered Egyptian married females take advantage of their
power by spending longer hours in the labour market. The problem is that, on the other
hand, they do not spend fewer hours in domestic activities which leads to the double
burden problem they suffer from.
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4.2 Results of the discrete choice model of labor supply
Table 10 displays the parameter estimates for the utility function. The parameters are
estimated via Maximum Simulated Likelihood under the i.i.d. assumption for the error
terms. Note that we only show the results of some of the distribution factors tested5.
As explanatory variables, we introduce different interaction variables. When looking to
the interaction x*Couple, we observe a positive coefficient which means that females in
couple attach a higher value to one unit of household net income than single females do.
However, the latter is not significant.
[Table 10 about here]
Results of the sharing rule parameters κ1 and κ2 are presented in table 11. As defined
earlier, those parameters represent the share of household net income that the female gets
for her consumption. Interestingly, contrarily to all other studies estimated using Euro-
pean data, this share tend to be negative. The first line of table 11 shows that, for all
women- regardless the age difference, her contribution to marriage costs or her Moakhar-
this share is of about -25.30. However, this estimated share is not statistically significant.
“Unfortunately, in the case of sub-groups for which the collective model is not rejected, the
sharing rule and individual preferences are not precisely estimated. A possible explana-
tion for this result is that these parameters are highly nonlinear functions of statistically
significant and insignificant parameter estimates” [Fortin and Lacroix (1997); 953].
[Table 11 about here]
In table 10, l represents the female’s labour supply choice. Clearly, coefficients of this
variable is always positive and statistically significant. Similarly, all interaction between
distribution factors and x or xl are not statistically significant; which imply that whether-
for example- the age difference between the female and her husband is low or high, that
doest not influence the share of income she gets from the household income. The latter
result explains the insignificance of the sharing rule parameters presented in table 11.
5Results of the other distribution facts are available upon request.
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5 Conclusion and Policy implication
In the present chapter, we estimate a discrete choice model of females labor supply
that is cast in the collective setting (Vermeulen, 2006). The latter takes into full consider-
ation the non participation possibility for females. For instance, the novelty of the present
research is that the collective framework is applied to Egyptian micro data in order to
analyze resource allocation patterns within Egyptian households. Both Married females’
preferences and the sharing rule parameters are fully identified by assuming that some
preference coefficients of married females are the same as those of their singles counter-
parts but leisure coefficients are allowed to differ between the two groups. And, we use
this difference in parameters between single and married females to infer something about
the sharing rule.
We also test new sources of females empowerment that are original to the Egyptian
context. We are fortunate to have the ELMPS 2006 that includes a whole section on
women status as well as on females contribution to marriage costs.
Empirical results show that the latter influence significantly the females labour supply
choices. An important conclusion of the present research is that Egyptian married females
do not really get any of the household income for their own consumption. They even tend
to spend their own money on the household since the estimated share is negative. But, all
this is not very precise since the sharing rule parameters are not statistically significant
as presented above.
Results presented here reflect the weak females position within their own family. Another
explanation could be that Egyptian females tend to have caring preferences towards their
families. In other words, instead of getting a share of the household income to spend on
their own consumption, they rather give a share of their own money to their families.
As noted, this study does not consider the domestic production nor taxation. We call for
future studies to model these latter in order to significantly improve the model’s reliability.
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Tables and Figures
Tables
Summary statistics
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (working sample)
Married couples Single Females
Variables Mean Std. der. Mean Std. der.
female participation 0.21 0.41 0.37 0.48
male participation 1 0
female education 1 0.22 0.41 0.27 0.44
female education 2 0.25 0.43 0.26 0.44
female education 3 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.11
female education 4 0.31 0.46 0.28 0.45
female education 5 0.20 0.40 0.18 0.39
male education 1 0.14 0.35
male education 2 0.34 0.47
male education 3 0.02 0.14
male education 4 0.26 0.44
male education 5 0.22 0.42
Dummy 1 for region 0.23 0.42 0.16 0 .37
Dummy 2 for region 0.18 0.39 0.14 0.34
Dummy 3 for region 0.24 0.43 0.29 0.45
Dummy 4 for region 0.34 0.47 0.41 0.49
Age (female) 34.85 10.037 30.74 12.48
Age (male) 39.94 10.50
years of experience (female) 12.79 9.89 7.93 8.39
years of experience (male) 13.59 9.59
Hourly gross wage rate (female) 5.18 35.07 2.41 7.02
Hourly gross wage rate (male) 2.14 6.04
working hours per week (female) 40.86 12.24 45.29 15.07
working hours per week (male) 60.07 12.22
Weekly consumption- non labor income 13.78 68.25 60.03 98.36
Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS 2006, Notes: Dummy for labor market participation: 1=
working, Dummy 1 for schooling: 1= Never gone to school, Dummy 2 for schooling: 1= Primary/ Preparatory,
Dummy 3 for schooling: 1= General Secondary, Dummy 4 for schooling: 1= 3-5 years of Technical secondary,
Dummy 5 for schooling: 1=Above intermediate/ University stages, Dummy 1 for region: 1= Cairo, Dummy
2 for region: 1= Alexandria & Suez Canal, Dummy 3 for region: 1=Urban areas in lower & upper Egypt,
Dummy 4 for region: 1= Rural areas in lower & upper Egypt.
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Empirical Results
Table 2: Determinants of married females labour supply
Coefficient t stat Coefficient t stat Coefficient t stat Coefficient t stat
Women Status Variables
Decision making Indicator 1.221*** 2.69
Gender role attitudes indicator 1.189*** 2.68
Access to financial resources * 1.884** 2.23
Access to financial resources * 1.17 1.24
household size -0.64*** 2.93 -0.66*** 2.96 -0.68*** 3.16 -0.71*** 3.18
female’s hourly wage -0.14 0.38 -0.14 0.39 -0.13 0.34 -0.15 0.40
Male’s hourly wage 0.22 0.65 0.24 0.71 0.22 0.65 0.22 0.63
female’s age 2.08*** 3.96 2.07*** 3.83 2.09*** 3.95 2.14*** 4.00
female’s age squared -0.02*** 2.86 -0.02*** 2.73 -0.02*** 2.87 -0.02*** 2.88
Male’s age -1.15*** 2.04 -1.11*** 1.98 -1.10** 1.99 -1.10** 1.98
Male’s age squared 0.01** 1.69 0.01* 1.60 0.01* 1.61 0.01 1.59
female’s education 1* -1.56 1.27 -1.47 1.19 -1.42 1.16 -1.45 1.19
female’s education 2* 1.59 0.41 1.08 0.27 0.99 0.25 1.37 0.35
female’s education 3* 11.60*** 4.04 11.49*** 3.91 11.63*** 4.1 11.81*** 4.07
female’s education 4* 19.75*** 6.18 19.71*** 6.03 19.83*** 6.26 19.98*** 6.14
Male’s education 1* -0.49 0.43 -0.65 0.57 -0.64 0.56 -0.47 0.41
Male’s education 2* 0.65 0.18 0.57 0.16 0.65 0.18 0.74 0.21
Male’s education 3* -0.14 0.07 -0.30 0.16 -0.28 0.14 -0.12 0.06
Male’s education 4* -0.42 -0.18 -0.79 0.34 -0.47 0.20 -0.51 0.22
Urban regions* -9.85*** 6.47 -10.03*** 6.57 -10.05*** 6.61 -10.22*** 6.62
Rural regions* -16.33*** 7.59 -16.49*** 7.65 -16.67*** 7.78 -16.70*** 7.73
Wealth index -0.16 0.36 -0.15 0.35 -0.17 0.41 -0.16 0.36
HH non labor income 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.90 -0.01 0.97
Constant 9.45 1.05 9.06 1.01 7.66 0.86 7.61 0.84
Observations 1938.00 1938.00 1938.00 1938.00
Centered R squared 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.39
Uncentered R squared 0.66 0.65 0.66 0.66
Hansen J statistic 21.11 21.18 21.89 21.35
Chi-sq(14) P-val 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.09
Notes: i. *** statistically significant at the 1% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, * statistically significant at the
10% level. ii. Those are the results of a generalized method of moments estimation. iii. females and males labor earnings are
instrumented. iv. * represents dummy variables.
Table 3: Determinants of married females labour supply
Coefficient t stat. Coefficient t stat. Coefficient t stat.
Women Status Variables
Mobility Indicator 0.241 0.290
Domestic Violence Indicator 0.241 0.290
Fear of men in hh * -0.528 0.530
household size -0.722*** 3.280 -0.722*** 3.280 -0.723*** 3.260
female’s hourly wage -0.174 0.440 -0.174 -0.440 -0.197 0.520
Male’s hourly wage 0.244 0.710 0.244 0.710 0.259 0.760
female’s age 2.088*** 3.740 2.088*** 3.740 2.060*** 3.760
female’s age squared -0.022*** 2.660 -0.022*** 2.660 -0.021*** 2.670
Male’s age -1.095*** 1.960 -1.095*** 1.960 -1.084* 1.920
Male’s age squared 0.011 1.570 0.011 1.570 0.010 1.550
female’s education 1* -1.407 1.140 -1.407 -1.140 -1.362 1.110
female’s education 2* 1.640 0.410 1.640 0.410 1.728 0.430
female’s education 3* 12.139*** 4.230 12.139*** 4.230 12.322*** 4.350
female’s education 4* 20.425*** 6.420 20.425*** 6.420 20.519*** 6.590
Male’s education 1* -0.577 0.510 -0.577 -0.510 -0.626 0.550
Male’s education 2* 0.566 0.160 0.566 0.160 0.511 0.140
Male’s education 3* -0.200 0.100 -0.200 -0.100 -0.317 0.160
Male’s education 4* -0.628 0.270 -0.628 -0.270 -0.776 0.330
Urban regions* -10.037*** 6.480 -10.037*** 6.480 -9.962*** 6.420
Rural regions* -16.477*** 7.360 -16.477*** 7.360 -16.372*** 7.530
Wealth index -0.093 0.210 -0.093 -0.210 -0.096 0.220
HH non labor income -0.005 -0.930 -0.005 -0.930 -0.005 0.960
Constant 8.152 0.890 8.152 0.890 8.599 0.930
Observations 1938.00 1938.00 1938.00
Centered R squared 0.385 0.385 0.378
Uncentered R squared 0.651 0.651 0.647
Hansen J statistic 21.178 21.178 21.087
Chi-sq(14) P-val 0.097 0.097 0.099
Notes: i. *** statistically significant at the 1% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, * statisti-
cally significant at the 10% level. ii. Those are the results of a generalized method of moments estimation.
iii. females and males labor earnings are instrumented. iv. * represents dummy variables.
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Table 4: Determinants of married females labour supply
Coefficient t stat. Coefficient t stat. Coefficient t stat. Coefficient t stat.
Marriage costs Ind. 0.379 0.740
Marriage costs 1 0.001*** 3.930
Marriage costs 2 0.003*** 2.430
Marriage costs 3 0.073* 1.630
household size -0.720*** 2.930 (-0.905)*** 4.120 (-0.755)*** 3.060 (-0.853)*** -3.590
female’s hourly wage -0.278 -0.660 -0.201 -0.470 -0.306 -0.730 -0.167 -0.350
Male’s hourly wage 0.188 0.520 0.221 0.760 0.176 0.480 0.178 0.580
female’s age 1.925*** 2.980 1.869*** 3.290 2.013*** 3.110 1.839*** 3.410
female’s age squared -0.020*** 2.210 (-0.018)*** 2.280 -0.021*** 2.300 -0.018*** -2.380
Male’s age -0.618 -0.980 -0.789 -1.350 -0.607 -0.960 -0.849 -1.470
Male’s age squared 0.005 0.640 0.007 1.020 0.005 0.610 0.008 1.110
female’s education 1* -2.430** 2.090 -1.992 1.67* -2.173** 1.840 -1.426 -1.220
female’s education 2* -6.022 -1.500 0.315 0.080 -5.612 1.400 0.828 0.210
female’s education 3* 10.540*** 4.980 10.918*** 5.320 10.892*** 5.160 10.961*** 4.280
female’s education 4* 18.655*** 6.440 19.093*** 7.380 19.099*** 6.640 19.825*** 6.620
Male’s education 1* 0.042 0.030 0.034 0.030 -0.053 -0.040 -0.414 -0.360
Male’s education 2* 2.569 0.580 2.461 0.650 2.434 0.550 0.808 0.230
Male’s education 3* 1.522 0.940 0.932 0.480 1.563 0.950 0.224 0.120
Male’s education 4* 1.394 0.650 0.288 0.130 0.995 0.470 -0.027 -0.010
Urban regions* -8.946*** 5.220 -9.570*** 6.420 -9.530*** 5.530 -9.504*** -6.190
Rural regions* -17.420*** 8.820 -16.759*** 9.61*** -17.969*** 9.070 -16.122*** -8.390
Wealth index -0.192 -0.420 -0.240 -0.580 -0.267 -0.580 -0.182 -0.470
HH non labor income -0.009 -1.350 -0.005 -1.030 -0.009 -1.360 -0.004 -0.800
Constant 3.924 0.370 6.392 0.650 2.490 0.230 7.623 0.720
Observations 1358.000 1717.000 1361.000 1840.000
Centered R squared 0.421 0.413 0.419 0.404
Uncentered R squared 0.668 0.674 0.667 0.663
Hansen J statistic 25.494 18.883 23.986 21.559
Chi-sq(14) P-val 0.030 0.169 0.046 0.088
Notes: i. *** statistically significant at the 1% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, * statistically significant at
the 10% level. ii. Those are the results of a generalized method of moments estimation. iii. females and males labor earnings
are instrumented. iv. * represents dummy variables.
Table 5: Determinants of married females labour supply
Coefficient t stat. Coefficient t stat. Coefficient t stat. Coefficient t stat.
Marriage costs 4 -0.042 -0.690
Marriage costs 5 0.031 1.420
Marriage costs 6 -0.057 -1.260
Marriage costs 7 0.061 1.210
household size -0.875*** -3.660 -0.865*** -3.620 -0.889*** -3.720 -0.857 -3.600
female’s hourly wage -0.183 -0.390 -0.199 -0.420 -0.198 -0.420 -0.157 -0.330
Male’s hourly wage 0.174 0.570 0.178 0.580 0.180 0.590 0.179 0.580
female’s age 1.876*** 3.480 1.835*** 3.400 1.885*** 3.500 1.818*** 3.370
female’s age squared -0.018*** -2.410 -0.018*** -2.350 -0.018*** -2.410 -0.017*** -2.320
Male’s age -0.852 -1.470 -0.816 -1.410 -0.833 -1.440 -0.825 -1.430
Male’s age squared 0.008 1.090 0.007 1.040 0.007 1.050 0.007 1.060
female’s education 1* -1.430 -1.220 -1.463 -1.260 -1.430 -1.220 -1.450 -1.240
female’s education 2* 0.726 0.190 0.484 0.130 0.723 0.190 0.649 0.170
female’s education 3* 11.165*** 4.360 11.067*** 4.310 11.163*** 4.340 10.952*** 4.280
female’s education 4* 19.932*** 6.650 19.824 *** 6.620 20.003*** 6.670 19.734*** 6.610
Male’s education 1* -0.392 -0.340 -0.406 -0.350 -0.421 -0.370 -0.401 -0.350
Male’s education 2* 0.810 0.240 0.843 0.240 0.734 0.210 0.794 0.230
Male’s education 3* 0.329 0.170 0.325 0.170 0.323 0.170 0.205 0.110
Male’s education 4* 0.012*** 0.000 -0.045 -0.020 -0.119 -0.060 -0.077 -0.040
Urban regions* -10.156*** -6.870 -9.701*** -6.410 -10.164*** -6.880 -9.651*** -6.330
Rural regions* -16.793*** -9.080 -16.296*** -8.600 -16.792*** -9.090 -16.302*** -8.550
Wealth index -0.193 -0.490 -0.184 -0.470 -0.185 -0.470 -0.184 -0.470
HH non labor income -0.004 -0.850 -0.004 -0.860 -0.004 -0.850 -0.004 -0.810
Constant 7.883 0.740 7.295 0.690 7.462 0.700 7.775 0.730
Observations 1840.000 1840 1840 1840
Centered R squared 0.402 0.401 0.400 0.4036
Uncentered R squared 0.662 0.662 0.661 0.6633
Hansen J statistic 20.841 21.675 20.899 21.634
Chi-sq(14) P-val 0.106 0.085 0.104 0.08644
Notes: i. *** statistically significant at the 1% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, * statistically significant
at the 10% level. ii. Those are the results of a generalized method of moments estimation. iii. females and males labor
earnings are instrumented. iv. * represents dummy variables.
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Table 6: Structural equations: market work versus domestic production
Dep. Var. 1 Dep. Var. 2 Dep. Var. 1 Dep. Var. 2
Market L. supply Domestic L.supply Market L. supply Domestic L.supply
Coefficient t. stat Coefficient t. stat Coefficient t. stat Coefficient t. stat
Domestic L.supply -0.081 -0.160 -0.102 -0.180
Decision making Indicator 1.371*** 1.950 1.148* 1.470
Gender role attitudes indicator 1.308*** 2.330 -0.575 -0.700
household size -0.477 -1.110 0.725*** 1.920 -0.478 -1.150 0.628** 1.660
female’s age 2.003*** 4.710 0.082 0.100 1.973*** 4.580 0.135 0.170
female’s age squared -0.023*** -3.030 -0.010 -0.910 -0.022*** -2.780 -0.010 -0.940
Male’s age -0.951** -1.680 0.452 0.470 -0.864* -1.450 0.522 0.540
Male’s age squared 0.009* 1.400 -0.005 -0.450 0.008 1.160 -0.006 -0.540
female’s education 1 -1.615 -1.180 -1.393 -0.680 -1.567 -1.130 -1.287 -0.620
female’s education 2 0.563 0.130 4.138 0.560 -0.085 -0.020 4.274 0.580
female’s education 3 10.195*** 8.010 0.614 0.250 9.951*** 7.510 1.145 0.460
female’s education 4 17.832*** 7.980 -2.099 -0.670 17.620*** 8.520 -1.408 -0.450
Male’s education 1 -0.676 -0.320 -3.358** -1.610 -0.890 -0.390 -3.392** -1.630
Male’s education 2 0.116 0.030 -2.040 -0.310 0.072 0.020 -2.055 -0.310
Male’s education 3 0.410 0.300 -0.091 -0.040 0.345 0.250 -0.082 -0.030
Male’s education 4 0.229 0.080 -4.303* -1.460 -0.068 -0.020 -4.317* -1.460
Urban regions -10.034*** -3.540 -5.088*** -2.240 -10.380*** -3.220 -5.372*** -2.370
Rural regions -16.757*** -9.470 -2.834 -1.190 -17.091*** -8.430 -3.190* -1.350
Wealth index -0.680 -1.060 -0.618 -0.960
female’s hourly wage -0.044 -0.860 -0.093*** -2.610 -0.046 -0.830 -0.093*** -2.600
Male’s hourly wage 0.026 0.310 0.158*** 2.950 0.025 0.270 0.159*** 2.960
HH non labor income -0.004 -0.670 -0.004 -0.450 -0.004 -0.620 -0.005 -0.570
Constant 12.087 0.420 55.279*** 3.670 12.555 0.410 53.044*** 3.530
N 1934 1934 1934 1934
R- squared 0.414 0.050 0.408 0.049
Chi2 1382.420 101.250 1368.530 1368.530
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: i. *** statistically significant at the 1% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, * statistically significant at the
10% level. ii. Estimation is made via 3SLS.
Table 7: Structural equations: market work versus domestic production
Dep. Var. 1 Dep. Var. 2 Dep. Var. 1 Dep. Var. 2
Market L. supply Domestic L.supply Market L. supply Domestic L.supply
Coefficient t. stat Coefficient t. stat Coefficient t. stat Coefficient t. stat
Domestic L.supply -0.075 -0.130 -0.052* 0.396
Access to financial resources (dummy) 1.814* 1.450 -1.516 -1.000
Access to financial resources (dummy) 1.457 2.000 4.861*** 3.300
household size -0.536 -1.230 0.635** 1.690 -0.568* 0.349 0.690** 1.840
female’s age 2.001*** 4.660 0.134 0.170 2.059 0.428 0.205 0.260
female’s age squared -0.022*** -2.770 -0.010 -0.930 -0.023 0.007 -0.011 -1.020
Male’s age -0.886* -1.460 0.531 0.550 -0.903 0.548 0.460 0.480
Male’s age squared 0.009 1.190 -0.006 -0.550 0.009 0.007 -0.006 -0.500
female’s education 1 -1.495 -1.060 -1.305 -0.630 -1.464 1.262 -1.289 -0.630
female’s education 2 -0.071 -0.020 4.407 0.600 0.182*** 4.081 3.621 0.490
female’s education 3 10.279*** 7.860 1.086 0.440 10.312 1.293 0.272 0.110
female’s education 4 17.990*** 8.650 -1.420 -0.450 18.037 2.252 -2.782 -0.890
Male’s education 1 -0.786 -0.330 -3.377* -1.620 -0.542 1.723 -3.055* -1.470
Male’s education 2 0.109 0.030 -2.046 -0.310 0.288** 3.608 -1.633 -0.250
Male’s education 3 0.413 0.300 -0.117 -0.050 0.441 1.372 0.040 0.020
Male’s education 4 0.249 0.070 -4.436* -1.500 0.257* 2.592 -4.430* -1.500
Urban regions -10.228*** -3.030 -5.409*** -2.390 -10.312 2.556 -5.775*** -2.550
Rural regions -17.029*** -8.090 -3.214* -1.360 -17.113 1.694 -3.398* -1.440
Wealth index -0.589 -0.920 -0.874* -1.360
female’s hourly wage -0.045 -0.770 -0.092*** -2.580 -0.040 0.041 -0.089*** -2.510
Male’s hourly wage 0.024 0.250 0.158*** 2.950 0.021 0.069 0.1609*** 3.010
HH non labor income -0.004 -0.750 -0.005 -0.540 -0.005 0.005 -0.005 -0.590
Constant 9.560 0.290 53.842*** 3.590 8.303 22.205 52.814*** 3.530
N 1934.000 1934.000 1934 1934
R- squared 0.414 0.049 0.417 0.054
Chi2 1377.420 100.020 1381.410 110.430
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: i. *** statistically significant at the 1% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, * statistically significant at the 10% level. ii.
Estimation is made via 3SLS.
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Table 8: Structural equations: market work versus domestic production
Dep. Var. 1 Dep. Var. 2 Dep. Var. 1 Dep. Var. 2
Market L. supply Domestic L.supply Market L. supply Domestic L.supply
Coefficient t. stat Coefficient t. stat Coefficient t. stat Coefficient t. stat
Domestic L.supply -0.160 -0.290 -0.160 -0.290
Mobility Indicator 0.678 0.300 4.064*** 4.500
Domestic Violence Indicator 0.678 0.300 4.064*** 4.500
household size -0.494 -1.070 0.732*** 1.960 -0.494 -1.070 0.732*** 1.960
female’s age 2.006*** 4.530 -0.109 -0.140 2.006*** 4.530 -0.109 -0.140
female’s age squared -0.023*** -3.250 -0.008 -0.710 -0.023*** -3.250 -0.008 -0.710
Male’s age -0.823* -1.350 0.554 0.580 -0.823* -1.350 0.554 0.580
Male’s age squared 0.008 1.070 -0.007 -0.560 0.008 1.070 -0.007 -0.560
female’s education 1 -1.629 -1.130 -1.421 -0.690 -1.629 -1.130 -1.421 -0.690
female’s education 2 0.777 0.170 4.259 0.580 0.777 0.170 4.259 0.580
female’s education 3 10.462*** 7.800 0.107 0.040 10.462*** 7.800 0.107 0.040
female’s education 4 18.023*** 7.090 -2.627 -0.840 18.023*** 7.090 -2.627 -0.840
Male’s education 1 -0.995 -0.450 -3.253* -1.570 -0.995 -0.450 -3.253* -1.570
Male’s education 2 -0.066 -0.020 -2.090 -0.320 -0.066 -0.020 -2.090 -0.320
Male’s education 3 0.493 0.350 0.534 0.210 0.493 0.350 0.534 0.210
Male’s education 4 -0.051 -0.020 -3.482 -1.180 -0.051 -0.020 -3.482 -1.180
Urban regions -10.746*** -3.470 -5.253*** -2.330 -10.746*** -3.470 -5.253*** -2.330
Rural regions -17.335*** -9.240 -2.883 -1.220 -17.335*** -9.240 -2.883 -1.220
Wealth index -0.651 -1.020 -0.651 -1.020
female’s hourly wage -0.053 -0.880 -0.104*** -2.930 -0.053 -0.880 -0.104*** -2.930
Male’s hourly wage 0.038 0.420 0.159*** 2.980 0.038 0.420 0.159*** 2.980
HH non labor income -0.005 -0.850 -0.004 -0.410 -0.005 -0.850 -0.004 -0.410
Constant 14.901 0.470 56.852*** 3.800 14.901 0.470 56.852*** 3.800
N 1934 1934 1934 1934
R- squared 0.382 0.059 0.382 0.059
Chi2 1300.170 120.220 1300.170 120.220
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: i. *** statistically significant at the 1% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, * statistically significant at the
10% level. ii. Estimation is made via 3SLS.
Table 9: Structural equations: market work versus domestic production
Dep. Var. 1 Dep. Var. 2 Dep. Var. 1 Dep. Var. 2
Market L. supply Domestic L.supply Market L. supply Domestic L.supply
Coefficient t. stat Coefficient t. stat Coefficient t. stat Coefficient t. stat
Domestic L.supply -0.130 -0.260 0.084 0.060
Fear of men in the hh (dummy) -0.666 -0.540 -2.018* -1.430
Marriage costs share Indicator 0.457 0.890 -0.119 -0.140
household size -0.519 -1.280 0.679** 1.810 -0.621 -1.060 0.415 1.010
female’s age 2.014*** 4.670 0.034 0.040 1.549*** 2.210 0.283 0.280
female’s age squared -0.023*** -3.150 -0.009 -0.840 -0.016 -0.840 -0.012 -0.860
Male’s age -0.825* -1.380 0.577 0.600 -0.459 -0.330 0.923 0.890
Male’s age squared 0.008 1.090 -0.007 -0.590 0.004 0.240 -0.010 -0.770
female’s education 1 -1.589 -1.160 -1.362 -0.660 -1.951 -0.670 -2.037 -0.930
female’s education 2 0.610 0.140 4.007 0.550 -6.908* -1.450 -0.312 -0.040
female’s education 3 10.485*** 8.110 0.644 0.260 9.988* 1.450 -5.337*** -1.970
female’s education 4 18.048*** 7.850 -2.250 -0.720 16.926*** 3.250 -4.063 -1.170
Male’s education 1 -0.938 -0.430 -3.482** -1.670 0.302 0.060 -3.783** -1.680
Male’s education 2 0.024 0.010 -1.988 -0.300 2.224 0.400 2.526 0.340
Male’s education 3 0.367 0.260 -0.173 -0.070 1.460 0.580 1.285 0.470
Male’s education 4 -0.052 -0.020 -4.334* -1.470 1.867 0.470 -2.864 -0.890
Urban regions -10.568*** -3.670 -5.252*** -2.320 -8.460*** -1.880 -3.106 -1.140
Rural regions -17.268*** -9.310 -3.100* -1.310 -17.283*** -4.800 -2.207 -0.760
Wealth index -0.702 -1.090 0.309 0.440
female’s hourly wage -0.049 -0.960 -0.095*** -2.650 -0.027 -0.130 -0.158** -1.730
Male’s hourly wage 0.032 0.390 0.157*** 2.930 0.026 0.320 0.048 0.600
HH non labor income -0.005 -0.840 -0.005 -0.560 -0.006 -0.930 0.000 0.020
Constant 13.321 0.470 55.449*** 3.680 1.130 0.020 37.982*** 2.230
N 1934 1934 1356 1356
R- squared 0.396 0.050 0.416 0.033
Chi2 1331.330 101.110 1001.200 46.540
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Notes: *** statistically significant at the 1% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, * statistically significant at the 10%
level. ii. Estimation is made via 3SLS.
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Table 10: Maximum Simulated Likelihood Estimates
Conditional logit model
Variables Coefficient t. stat. Coefficient t. stat. Coefficient t. stat. Coefficient t. stat.
lSq 0,817*** 1330,000 0,817*** 1330,000 0,812*** 1296,000 0,806*** 1306,000
lSq * education dummy1 -0,334*** -467,000 -0,334*** -467,000 -0,323*** -430,000 -0,316*** -426,000
lSq * education dummy2 -0,123 -149,000 -0,123 -149,000 -0,128 -152,000 -0,112 -135,000
lSq * education dummy3 0,062 81,000 0,062 81,000 0,063 80,000 0,066 86,000
lSq * Couple -0,044 -83,000 -0,044 -84,000 -0,037 -67,000 -0,045 -82,000
x * l 0,000 -11,000 0,000 -10,000 0,000 -15,000 0,000 -17,000
x * l * Couple 0,005 141,000 0,010** 196,000 0,005 107,000 0,004 57,000
x 0,000 31,000 0,000 31,000 0,000 28,000 0,000 28,000
x * Couple 35,008 16,000 844130,100 2,000 141556,200 1,000 -5867546,000 -2,000
l -29,462*** -1270,000 -29,462*** -1270,000 -29,263*** -1237,000 -28,971*** -1244,000
l * education dummy1 7,128*** 270,000 7,134*** 270,000 6,563 237,000 6,256** 229,000
l * education dummy2 -1,501 -49,000 -1,509 -50,000 -1,189 -38,000 -1,804 -59,000
l * education dummy3 -5,328** -185,000 -5,335* -185,000 -5,385* -182,000 -5,560** -192,000
l * Couple -1,191 -61,000 -1,147 -59,000 -1,638 -79,000 -1,358 -67,000
x * l * Couple * Age difference -0,001 -132,000
x * Couple * Age difference -422008,500 -2,000
x * l * Couple * Moakhar 0,000 -14,000
x * Couple * Moakhar -2828,620 -1,000
x * l * Couple * Marriage costs 0,000 11,000
x * Couple * Marriage costs 115052,200 2,000
Log likelihood -200975,160 -200770,680 -187293,990 -190659,750
Pseudo R squared 47,260 47,320 47,310 47,390
Prob > chi2 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Notes: i. Estimation is done using simulated maximum likelihood. ii. Coefficients and t. stat. are multiplied by 100. iii. Reference for
education is“illiterate”. iv. Moakhar is the amount of money the husband will have to pay to the woman in case of divorce. The latter is
determined before marriage takes place. v. *** statistically significant at the 1% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, * statistically
significant at the 10% level.
Table 11: Estimates of the Sharing Rule Parameters
Coefficient Std. Errors Lower CI Upper CI
No Distribution factor
k1 -25,303 231,544 -479,120 428,514
k2 - - - -
Age Difference
k1 -56,100 525,628 -1086,312 974,112
k2 5,600 53,510 -99,278 110,479
Moakhar
k1 -19,316 126,544 -267,338 228,706
k2 0,001 0,009 -0,016 0,018
Female’s contribution to marriage
k1 -13,103 72,625 -155,446 129,240
k2 -0,077 0,809 -1,663 1,510
Notes: i. κ1 and κ2 are calculated using the delta method. ii. The command in Stata is “nlcom”.
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Figures
Figure 1: Percentages of females in each labor supply alternative by marital status
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Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS 2006.
Figure 2: Percentages of married and single females by labor supply alternative
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Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS 2006.
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Figure 3: Single females by education level and labour supply alternative (1)
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Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS 2006.
Figure 4: Married females by education level and labour supply alternative (1)
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Non 
Participants
Part time
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
full time Over Total
 
 
University
Above intermediate
Technical secondary
General secondary
Primary/prep.
No schooling
Total
Over 
full time
Part time
Non Participants
Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS 2006.
27
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.35
Figure 5: Single females by education level and labour supply alternative (2)
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Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS 2006.
Figure 6: Married females by education level and labour supply alternative (2)
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Appendix
Calculation methods
Calculation of the household non-labor income
The household non-labor income are recovered from different sources. The first type
of non-labor incomes we consider are the transfers, denoted by Y1, whether from non-
household members or from household members who are away from home. Note that a
significantly high proportion of Egyptians, namely males, migrate to other Arab countries
and especially Gulf countries and transfer money to their families in Egypt. Data on other
miscellaneous sources of non labor income are also available in the ELMPS as incomes
from household pensions and assistances that we denote Y2. the latter includes retirement
pensions, social security benefits and Sadat/Mubarak pensions. And finally, we take into
account different types of compensations as disability benefits, ill/injury compensations.
And this kind of non-labor incomes is represented by the Y3 term. However, our analysis
completely ignores the taxation and redistribution system for data limitation. But future
studies taking into consideration this latter are highly recommended.
Estimation of potential wages: hourly wages for non-participating females
In order to obtain wages for the whole population, including non participant females,
different methods have been tested: The ordinary least squares (OLS)estimation or the
two-steps Heckman specification. However, when applying the second method, a difficulty
arises due to selectivity: a participation model would need to be based on the collective
framework, which is difficult. To resolve this problem, we followed Lewbel (2000) who
proposes an estimation method for the selection model which does not require the specifica-
tion of the selection mechanism. We also applied OLS and found no significant differences
between the two methods.
Variables definition: Women status indicators
Participation in household decision making: In the data, we have different vari-
ables that indicates the whether the female participates in household decision making.
The main question is as follows: Who in your family usually has the final say on the
following decisions?
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And this question is applied for the following types of household decisions,
Variable 1: Making large household purchases.
Variable 2: Making household purchases for daily needs.
Variable 3: Visits to family, friends or relatives.
Variable 4: What food should be cooked each day.
Variable 5: getting medical treatment or advice for herself.
Variable 6: buying clothes for herself.
We create dummy variables for each decision that takes the value zero if the female does
not participate in the decision making at all and that equals to one whether she takes the
decision alone, jointly with her husband or jointly with husband and family. Similarly, for
single females, this variable is equal to one only if the female takes the decision alone or
jointly with her parents.
Women direct access to financial resources: Two main questions are available in
the data to infer something about the access of women to cash household resources. Two
dummy variables are created. the first is equal to one if the woman has direct access to
household money in her hand to use and equals to zero if not. And, the second variable
consists on knowing whether the female personally has saving, own land, house, jewelry,
or other valuables which she can sell or use.
Women mobility: This section on women mobility is quite important since it allows
us to better understand the ability of women to move outside the household. Three
variables are taking into account,
Variable 1: Mobility to the local market.
Variable 2: Mobility to the local health center or doctor.
Variable 3: Mobility to the home of relatives or friends in the neighborhood.
And, the latter variables take the value of one if the female can go out without permission
or just need to inform other members in the household. And they take the value of zero
otherwise: If she needs permission or cannot go alone.
Women opinions towards domestic violence: Questions related to domestic vi-
olence are only applied to ever married women. Domestic violence can be the result of
different reasons as burning the food, arguing with the husband, talking to other me,
wasting husband’s money, and refusing sex to her husband. The latter are considered as
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good proxies for women bargaining power. As for the other empowerment measures, we
create dummy variables that take the value one when the married female answers yes to
these questions and zero otherwise. Moreover, we are fortunate to have one variable that
indicates whether the female is generally afraid to disagree with her husband (father or
brother) or other males in the household. Note that the latter variable is available for all
women and not only for married ones.
Questions on gender role attitudes: In the Egyptian labor market and panel
survey of 2006, we also have detailed variables on gender role attitudes. The latter are the
most convenient to be used as distribution factors as they are exogenous to the household
bargaining process. Moreover, these variables significantly affect females preferences (as
showed in the results).
As represented bellow, very detailed question related to gender role attitudes are addressed
in the data,
Variable 1: females place is not only in the household but also in the labor market.
Variable 2: If working woman then the husband should help with the children.
Variable 3: If working woman then the husband should help in household chores.
Variable 4: A thirty year old woman who has a good job but is not yet married is pitied.
Variable 5: Girls should go to school to prepare for jobs not just to make them good
mothers and wives.
Variable 6: A woman who has a full-time job cannot be a good mother.
Variable 7: For a woman’s financial autonomy, she must work and have earnings.
Variable 8: Having a full-time job always interferes with the ability to keep a good life
with her husband.
Variable 9: Women should continue to occupy leadership positions in society.
Variable 10: Boys and girls should get the same amount of schooling.
Variable 11: Boys and girls should be treated equally.
The answers to these questions are ordered from one to five. And, from the five categories
we create dummy variables that take the value one if the female strongly agrees or at lease
agrees with these facts and take the value zero otherwise. In other words, a positive and
significant effect of these variables on females labor supply imply that females agreeing
with equal gender roles (more empowered in a sense) tend to spend more time in the labor
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market.
Women contribution to marriage costs: In the context of Egypt, about three
quarters of the costs of marriage arrangement are usually supported by the groom and his
family, while the bride and her family’s contribution is in small home furnishing, the gihaz
(trousseau) (Rashad et al., 2005). Spouses physical capital bought to marriage is proxied
by two variables, one for the husband and the other for the wife. The latter are obtained
by adding up the monetary shares of the wife and her family in the marriage costs. And
the same for the husband’s contribution share. These costs include the preparation of the
marriage apartment, the purchase of furniture, electronic appliances, and other parts of
the gihaz (see Namoro and Roushdy, 2008).
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